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Annual Report of the Ombudsman 2000

Chapter Three - The Ombudsman, the Law and the Citizen - a Values-based Approach

Primary and Secondary Legislation

Public servants have a difficult task in administering a multitude of schemes and programmes which impinge on every aspect of life. The volume of legislation on the statute books is ever increasing and some of it, although antiquated, is still in force. Approximately 425 Acts of the Oireachtas were passed between 1990 and 2000. In addition, there has been a proliferation of secondary, or delegated legislation, with a lot of it coming from the European Union. In the last decade the average annual number of pieces of delegated legislation passed amounted to around 450. In 1998 alone 572 pieces of secondary legislation were enacted.

My views on secondary legislation are well known with the publication of my reports on Nursing Home Subventions and on Lost Pension Arrears. Such legislation is subjected to little or no scrutiny by the Houses of the Oireachtas. I have to acknowledge the utility of secondary legislation, in terms of the flexibility it provides for voluminous and often complex regulations and the virtual impossibility of the Houses scrutinising all such legislation. However, I have also made the point that penalties or burdens should only be imposed by regulation where it is clear that the Oireachtas intended in the relevant primary legislation that this should be the case. I have also suggested that the specific approval of the Houses should be required in the case of regulations which confer entitlements, require payments by, or otherwise impose penalties on, members of the public. The impact of such legislation can have a profound, and at times unexpected, impact. For instance, in my 1998 Annual Report (pages 20 -22) I cited the example of sections of the Housing (Disabled Persons and Essential Repairs Grants) Regulations, 1993 which resulted in tax compliant grant applicants being disqualified from their entitlements because the tax affairs of the builders doing the repairs were not in order.

From a public body's perspective, decision making has become an increasingly complex task which has to be undertaken with the added pressure of time and budgetary constraints. I find that complaints are becoming more complex and on occasions, can require considerable legal and other research by my Office. To a certain extent I have the luxury of being able to allow time and resources to be committed to the detailed examination of the more complex complaints I receive and to communicate my considered views to the public bodies concerned as well as to the Houses of the Oireachtas. But it is equally important that I take the time to explain my approach and role in relation to complaints which hinge on the interpretation and application of legislation as my role is not always fully understood.

A Values-based Approach to the State/Citizen Relationship

The powers and functions of public bodies are set out in law but in using their powers and exercising their functions, public bodies are nearly always allowed a considerable degree of discretion. In a democracy, it is essential that citizens have an assurance that public bodies will use their powers and exercise their functions not only in a proper and legal manner but also in a manner consistent with fairness and good administration. In my 1996 Annual Report, I published a Guide to Standards of Best Practice for Public Servants in their dealing with citizens which is available in leaflet form. In drawing up this guide, I had regard not only to the list of undesirable administrative actions set out in Section 4 of the Ombudsman Act 1980 but also to the general principles of administrative law as articulated by the Irish Courts, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice.

In the past year or two, I have become increasingly aware that, without taking from their importance, these general principles, nevertheless, reflect a traditional view of the role of public bodies. They emphasise the constraints which are properly placed on public bodies when dealing with people and making decisions affecting them. In essence public bodies are required to avoid illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety and lack of proportionality - otherwise their decisions may be open to challenge by way of judicial review. Of course, these principles have developed significantly over time. They have been influenced by changes in society and in governance, generally, and, in particular, by developments relating to concepts of citizenship and democratic participation. But I am taken with the growing debate among academic lawyers about the values which underpin the principles enunciated in various court decisions relating to administrative law cases and to judicial review.

These values are often referred to as "background rights" but they are not themselves rights. Essentially, rights are the means to protect values. Whereas rights are related to the process and procedures of decision-making, values relate to the significance of the action or decision for the individuals who are affected by it. In other words, a decision may be procedurally correct and in accordance with the law, but in order to assess the values underpinning the decision it is necessary to focus on the outcome of the decision. One commentator1 has referred to values as the "background moral view of how life in an organised society ought to be for individuals". Another2 has identified five core values governing the state/citizen relationship which she expresses as the need to uphold the autonomy, dignity, respect, status and security of individuals.

In Chapter One I referred to the changing nature of public service organisations. Given this change, is there a need for a clearer statement of the values which the State should uphold and respect in its dealings with citizens? I would draw a distinction here between, on the one hand, the values which individual public servants are expected to have in performing their functions such as integrity, honesty, avoidance of conflicts of interests, accountability, fairness, openness and effectiveness and, on the other, the core values underlying the way in which they should treat citizens. I would also draw a distinction between these core values and the principles of quality customer service set out in the Practical Guide for the Development of Quality Customer Service Actions Plans promulgated under the Strategic Management Initiative.

In summary, the well established principles of administrative law to which I referred earlier must be seen as essential means to an end rather than an end in themselves. It has become clear to me - and I highlighted this aspect in my recent report on Nursing Home Subventions - that public bodies often lose sight of the end result of many of their actions even actions which are initially well intentioned. The housing grants for people with disabilities referred to earlier in this chapter also illustrates the point.

I hope to develop these concepts by reference to future cases because it seems to me that it would be well worthwhile trying to assist public bodies to adopt a more values-based approach when dealing with people now that a human rights approach to service provision is becoming necessary. The five core values of autonomy, dignity, respect, status and security which I mentioned above are interlinked. But it is clear to me that values such as autonomy, dignity and respect are particularly important in the case of groups such as the elderly and people with disabilities who should be assured that they are of equal worth to other members of society. Status - by which I mean a person's position or standing in our society - will be important for marginalised groups who are unable to play an active role in influencing their own futures. Security - which involves protection against unwarranted and damaging change - may be threatened by actions taken by the State in pursuit of what it may see as the common good but which may impact adversely on particular individuals. I have referred earlier in my report to my concerns in the area of planning. Again, I must emphasise that these values are not the same as rights. They are intended to provide a means of focusing on the impact of decisions on individuals, particularly where the outcome is an adverse one.

An important part of my role as Ombudsman is to introduce a human element into the relationship between the State and its citizens. I try to ensure that the law is applied correctly but I also try to soften an unduly rigid interpretation of the law where equity demands it and I draw attention to imperfections in the law which may adversely affect people's entitlements. Many of the cases which follow demonstrate how people have been adversely affected by an erroneous or harsh application of the law where a values-based approach would have avoided injustice.

Footnotes 1. N. McCormick "Jurisprudence and the Constitution" [1983]. 2. Dawn Oliver "The Underlying Values of Public and Private Law" in Michael Taggart (ed.) "The Province of Administrative Law" [1997].

In the following case the Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development adopted an unduly rigid interpretation of the Early Retirement from Farming Scheme in seeking to justify a decision to refuse a pension application.

I received a complaint from a woman whose husband had submitted an application under the Early Retirement from Farming Scheme on the date of his death. It is a condition of the scheme that if a pensioner in receipt of an Early Retirement Pension dies, the balance of the pension may be paid to the spouse and/or dependants, subject to certain criteria being met. The Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development initially rejected the application on the basis that it was incomplete on the date it was submitted. In this instance, the Department took the view that an application could only be considered valid and approved when it was accompanied by all the required documentation. In this case, there was some essential documentation missing from the application.

I was aware, from examining other complaints, that the Department routinely accepted incomplete applications and regularly sought the outstanding documentation after an application had been submitted. When all missing documentation had been checked by the Department, that application was then deemed to be valid. In the light of this, I advised the Department that its position in this case was unnecessarily rigid. It then sought legal advice from the Office of the Attorney General (AG). The AG indicated that payment in this case could be made on the basis that the application was substantially complete at the time of the applicant's death and that the scheme provided for payment to be made to his widow if she met certain criteria. The AG also indicated that the Department was entitled to treat as exceptional the particular circumstances of the case. However, the Department felt that to accept the advice would constitute a departure from its standard practice and from the conditions of the scheme. It then contacted the European Commission which advised the Department that, in revising its decision and granting the application as an exceptional matter, it would not be acting in a manner incompatible with the EU Regulations governing the scheme. As a result, the applicant finally obtained her pension of £618 (€784.70) per month and arrears which amounted to £15,871(€20,152.01).

Schemes which are designed to provide benefits must, of necessity, have rules which clarify entitlement and ensure fairness. I have been critical of public bodies which apply rules in so rigid a manner that they exclude those for whom the benefit was originally intended. In this context I believe that it is equally important to highlight instances where an enlightened and flexible approach has been taken by a public body which has led to a satisfactory outcome to a complaint. The following case involving the Office of the Revenue Commissioners is one such instance.

The complaint concerned the scheme operated by the Office of the Revenue Commissioners whereby tax relief is available on a vehicle acquired for the transport of persons with disabilities. In this instance the foster parents of a profoundly mentally and physically handicapped girl had been granted full tax relief in respect of a motor vehicle which had been adapted to cater for the transport needs of their foster child. Respite care for the foster child was provided by a second person who also applied for tax relief in respect of a vehicle purchased by her for the transport of the girl while she was in her care. This application was refused on the grounds that it was a requirement of the scheme that the recipient of the tax relief be a family member residing with and responsible for the transportation of the person with the disability.

I asked the Revenue Commissioners to review the case. It concluded that its decision to refuse tax relief was correct but, in the particular circumstances of the case, it would allow the tax relief sought on a once-off basis provided the foster parents undertook not to make a further claim under the scheme for two years after the relief was allowed in respect of the respite carer's vehicle. This proposal was acceptable to both parties and the respite carer received a refund of £2,048 (€2,600.42) in respect of Value Added Tax and Vehicle Registration Tax on the vehicle she had purchased.

A decision taken by a public body which is strictly in accordance with the terms of the relevant scheme may, nonetheless, be open to question if inequity arises having regard to the individual circumstances. This arose in the following complaint against the Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs.

A man had to take early retirement from work in July 1993 because of ill-health. He was not, at that stage, diagnosed as suffering from Alzheimer's Disease. In his particular circumstances he would have had an entitlement to either Disability Benefit (DB) or Invalidity Pension (IP) at the time he was forced to take early retirement. He was unaware that he had an entitlement to these benefits and, therefore, made no claim at the time. In May 1994, his wife was prompted to make enquiries of the local Social Welfare Services Office because of her husband's relatively small occupational pension. She was advised to make an application on her husband's behalf for DB and was paid six months arrears effective from November 1993. The Department refused to pay arrears of more than six months on the basis that the relevant legislation precluded this - irrespective of the reason why the claim was late. In November 1994 he was transferred to IP, a long-term payment which is higher than the DB rate and which is payable to those who are unable to return to the workforce because of illness or incapacity.

A question that arose was whether the Department, when examining late claims for DB, should apply the same principles and logic as applied in late claims to social welfare contributory pensions. If the failure to claim the pension on time was directly attributable to this man's illness and an inability to manage his own affairs then the Department could have used an extra-statutory arrangement to pay full arrears of pension. This arrangement has since been formalised in legislation. The Department accepted that the man was unable to manage his own affairs but considered that as he had been an insured worker for a long number of years it was reasonable to expect that his wife would have dealt with his social welfare entitlements on his behalf. I did not accept this argument, particularly as his spouse had the added pressure of coping with her husband who was suffering from the onset of Alzheimer's Disease. I considered that the Department's actions in this case, while taken with proper authority, resulted in an outcome which did not take into account the special circumstances of the complainant.

As the Department appeared unwilling to move from its position, I notified it of my decision to commence an investigation.

In response the Department accepted that it should have been apparent from the medical evidence and correspondence available at the material time that the man was likely to have an immediate entitlement to IP, which could be back-dated beyond the six month period in accordance with the extra-statutory arrangement. If his claim had been dealt with in this manner, entitlement to an IP would ensue and arrears of pension could have been paid to him with effect from the commencement of his illness and the forced cessation of his employment. The Department accordingly awarded him an IP with effect from the commencement of his illness and arrears of £1,435 (€1,822.07) were paid to him. A further payment of £108 (€137.13) was made in respect of compensation for loss of purchasing power of the arrears. The Department also issued an apology to the man's wife. A further positive outcome of the case was the acceptance by the Department that arrangements for such arrears payments should be set out clearly in legislation so that they will be clearly understood. The Department had previously argued that its experience did not suggest that legislation was warranted to deal with late claims for DB or IP.

I welcomed the Department's commitment to introduce new legislation to deal with the problems experienced in this case. This should help to ensure that those people who make late claims for DB or IP, because of a verifiable incapacity or force majeure, will have their claims considered from the date of the commencement of their illness or injury.

In the following case the Valuation Office failed to meet a statutory deadline for determining a valuation leading to financial loss for the owners of a premises. It subsequently agreed that the circumstances of the case merited monetary redress.

The Development Manager of a Citizens Information Centre (CIC) complained that his local authority was demanding full commercial rates for its premises. The premises was being used for a purpose which should have rendered it exempt from rates.

My examination of the complaint showed that the difficulty arose from the valuation placed on the premises by the Valuation Office (VO). The local authority did not have the necessary discretion to waive rates where the premises had been valued on the basis of its previous use as a public house and ancillary offices. When I questioned the VO, it explained that on 11 May 1998 it had received a request for revision of the valuation placed on the premises. Section 3(3) of the Valuation Act, 1988 provides that "... the Commissioner of Valuation shall cause every application made to him under subsection (1) of this section to be determined within six months after receiving the application or as soon as may be thereafter and as soon as practicable issue a list of determinations made in the quarter beginning on the commencement of this section or in any succeeding quarter within ten days after the end of that quarter."

To comply with these statutory deadlines, the request for revaluation would have had to be processed and issued on or before 10 November 1998. Unfortunately, largely due to an industrial dispute which seriously affected the VO's output in 1998, the request was not processed in time to have effect in 1999. The property was inspected during 1999 and returned in the revised valuation lists to the local authority on 10 November 1999. Exemption from rates for the premises commenced on 1 January 2000. The initial revision request was received in May 1998, however, and had it been processed in accordance with the Valuation Act, 1988 the premises could have benefited from exemption from 1 January 1999. The VO expressed regret that it had been unable to process the case in 1998 and offered to make an ex gratia payment of £2258 (€2,867.07) to the CIC towards the rates liability in 1999.

I felt that the VO acted reasonably by accepting responsibility and in making the ex gratia payment. The complainant also found the offer to be acceptable.

In this case the South Eastern Health Board failed to notify an applicant for a nursing home subvention of a statutory discretion available to the Chief Executive Officer in assessing such applications. It also followed unfair and inadequate procedures in assessing the application.

In general, applications for subvention must be made before the person takes up residence in a nursing home. Otherwise, a person may not apply for a subvention within two years of the date of admission. There are two exceptions to this rule. The first is where the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), exercises a statutory discretion to accept an application. The second is where the health board is satisfied that the person needed to be admitted as an emergency and the nursing home had no option but to admit the person at the time.

The complainant said that her father had entered a nursing home in advance of making the application. The South Eastern Health Board refused the application without advising the applicant of the discretion vested in the CEO. It had also refused to accept medical evidence supporting a claim of admission in emergency circumstances.

The complainant's father, who was 81 years of age and resided with her, had required a short period of care in one of the Board's hospitals. Prior to his discharge, his consultant physician indicated that he would have to be admitted to a nursing home as his daughter would not have been able to provide the necessary nursing care.

She applied later to the Board for a nursing home subvention on behalf of her father and explained the circumstances of his admission to the nursing home. She said that, on the day of his discharge from hospital, a staff member assisted her in making arrangements for his admission to the home. It was at that stage she found out about the subvention. She did not apply immediately as she thought her father's stay in the home would only be for a few weeks. His condition deteriorated, however, and he remained in the home until his death, three months later.

The Board refused the application for subvention, and a subsequent appeal, on the grounds that he had been admitted to the nursing home prior to the date of receipt of the application. The complainant made a request to have the application considered as an admission to the nursing home in emergency circumstances. The Appeals Officer refused stating that it was not an emergency admission because the man had already been an in-patient in the hospital prior to his admission to the nursing home.

Further supporting evidence was provided by the family GP. However, the Appeals Officer again refused the application, restating the original reasons for the refusal. I asked the Board whether there had been a fundamental change in his condition after his admission to the nursing home which would have led him to become sufficiently dependent to require care in a nursing home. I also asked the Board if it would, in such circumstances, exercise its discretion to waive the two year restriction on making an application for subvention.

The Board rejected this approach stating that any patient in a nursing home would undergo changes in their medical condition over a period of two years. It argued that to award subventions to people who had become patients in nursing homes prior to seeking approval, on the grounds that their health had deteriorated subsequently, would mean that practically all such cases would have to be accepted, as the majority of such applicants could make a case on these grounds.

A subsequent report furnished by her father's consultant physician stated;

"...we let your father go from hospital only on condition that he was going to a Nursing Home. I don't think that in view of his overall condition at the time he was with us in hospital we would have been able to discharge or transfer him other than for care in a Nursing Home...It would have been impossible for you to provide this care on your own and he would have needed professional nursing care in a Nursing Home. "

I requested that the Board review the case in the light of this report. I asked whether the applicant had been advised of the discretion vested in the CEO to accept late applications, and if not, why he was not so advised.

The Board replied that the report from the consultant physician did not warrant a change in the decision. It stated that, while the applicant had not been advised of the discretion vested in the CEO, it had considered the matter in that context but decided that it was not appropriate to use the discretion in the particular case. In addition, the Board did not consider the admission took place in emergency circumstances.

I was satisfied that there was prima facie evidence of maladministration on the grounds that the Board:

• refused the application without advising the applicant of the discretion vested in the CEO;
• appeared to have misdirected itself in relation to the discretion;
• failed to maintain adequate documentation of the reasons for decisions;
• refused, without reasons, to accept medical evidence supporting the claim of admission in emergency circumstances, and
• appeared to have inadequate appeals procedures.

Based on my conclusions the case was reviewed by the Appeals Officer. She concluded that the decision to refuse the application under emergency circumstances might not have been correct on the grounds that the covering letter accompanying the application indicated that the hospital was discharging the patient either to his own home, or a nursing home, thereby forcing his daughter to make a decision. In such circumstances, she considered that the actions of the hospital, one of the Board's institutions, had contributed to the decision to place the complainant's father in the nursing home.

The Appeals Officer also said that when the case was initially considered she had assumed that the nursing home was aware of the requirement of prior application, but subsequently conceded that it may not have provided that information to the applicant. She was satisfied that the evidence now presented indicated that the complainant's father had been in need of nursing home care and she recommended that the application be accepted with payment effective from the date of application.

Following the resolution of a separate dispute in relation to the assessment of the family's means, payment was made effective from the date of application and the amount involved, based on the full subvention at the maximum dependency rate, was calculated at £1,646 (€2,089.99).

I was not satisfied that the procedures employed by the Board in respect of applications were adequate, or that a similar case might not recur. However, I acknowledge that this eventuality will be less likely having regard to the improved procedures which the CEO undertook to put in place. He directed that any person aggrieved by a decision of the Board on subvention was to be informed of the right of appeal to him. He also confirmed that, in general, he was encouraging officers of the Board to give the benefit of the doubt to the applicant in cases of borderline interpretation of the Regulations.

In the following complaint against South Dublin County Council an incorrect interpretation of eligibility criteria under the statutory Tenant Purchase Scheme would, but for my intervention, have led to considerable adverse affect for the complainant.

Where a person has been adversely affected by the incorrect actions of a body, everything possible should be done to ensure that the person is returned to the position he/she would have been in if the incorrect action had not taken place. The principle was relevant to a case where South Dublin County Council refused to allow a woman purchase her house when she applied in 1995 under the 1995 Tenant Purchase Scheme. She was not formally refused but was told over the phone that her application could not proceed as in the view of the Council she occupied a type of house that was ineligible for sale under the terms of the scheme.

I established that the Council was incorrect in stating that it was prevented from selling the house to her under the scheme and following my intervention, it agreed to allow her purchase the house. However, she returned to me some time later to say that it had offered her the house at the 1998 price rather than the 1995 price. She felt this was unfair as the house had increased substantially in value since 1995, and it was not her fault that there had been a delay.

The Council argued that it was highly unlikely that she would have been allowed purchase in 1995 even if it had accepted her application because of financial and other circumstances. It also pointed out that she had not pursued her application since 1995 and had actually applied for the installation of central heating and an extension. It felt that this showed that she had lost interest in purchasing the house.

I examined the matter and made the following points to the Council:

• the complainant was incorrectly advised at the outset that the house she occupied was ineligible for inclusion in the 1995 Tenant Purchase Scheme. Although she did not receive a formal decision in the matter, the Council accepted that she was incorrectly advised at the time;
• because of the incorrect action in 1995, no proper examination of her circumstances, including ability to pay, was carried out at that time;
• her family would have assisted her financially had she encountered difficulties with repayments;
• while the Council argued that she did not pursue her application after 1995 she said that a significant element in her application for an extension in 1996 was the fact that, such extension would have changed the categorisation of the house and enabled her to purchase it. Had the correct decision been made at the outset, the question of an extension would not likely have arisen.

Given that the Council had not examined her application properly at the appropriate time, I considered that the complainant ought to be given the benefit of the doubt in relation to her ability to qualify on income grounds. The fact remained that South Dublin County Council had made serious administrative errors in the handling of her application.

The Council reconsidered the matter and agreed to sell her the house at the 1995 price.

In the following case an incorrect application by Dundalk Urban District Council of Regulations governing the payment of a Disabled Persons Grant could have left the complainant at a financial loss.

The complainant applied to Dundalk Urban District Council for a Disabled Persons Grant for the provision of ground floor accommodation for her mobility impaired elderly husband. During the examination of the complaint it emerged that the Council, over a period of three years, had sought several quotations for the necessary works but, as the quotations received exceeded the maximum grant payable, there was a considerable shortfall which would have to be met from other sources. The Council felt that the complainant would not be in a position to finance this shortfall and, in the circumstances, it did not process her grant application further.

The Council also said that the complainant's existing accommodation was a three bedroom, two storey, terraced house with the bedrooms and bathroom upstairs. The Council pointed out that, in the past, the complainant had been offered a transfer to a two bedroom bungalow style house with all facilities at ground floor level and that she had refused to accept the transfer.

Having considered the matter in detail I drew the Council's attention to Article 4(2)(a) of the Housing (Disabled Persons and Essential Repairs Grants) Regulations, 1993 (S.I. No. 262 of 1993) which provides that:

"A grant under this article shall not exceed - (a) the approved cost of the works in the case of a house let by a housing authority pursuant to any of their functions under the housing Acts, 1966 to 1992." The complainant was renting the house from the Council. She did not own it and the Council was aware of this. Therefore, the Regulations provided that the Council could pay a grant up to the approved cost of the works. In this case the approved cost of the works was £17,000 (€21,585.55). I took the view that the Council should not seek a contribution from the complainant towards the cost of the project on the basis that the Council, rather than the complainant, owned the house.

With regard to the Council's suggestion that the complainant and her husband avail of a housing transfer, I noted that, over the years, they had built up a social support system in their local community and, accordingly, I would not expect them to move house, against their will, at this stage of their lives. Accordingly, I asked the Council to consult with the Department of the Environment and Local Government on how it might finance the shortfall in the available grant funding.

Having reconsidered the matter, the Council did not deem it necessary to refer the matter to the Department. Instead, it obtained further tenders to undertake the required extension and the project was completed. The Council financed it from the grant and from its own financial resources.

In the following case Kilkenny County Council argued that it had no statutory power to make available certain planning documents for purchase by the public. I argued that it was not precluded and that a Department circular and good administrative practice suggested that the documents should be made available.

The Council refused to make available, for purchase, copies of a planner's report and other documentation from a planning file. The complainant maintained that this was contrary to the recommendations of the Department of the Environment and Local Government that such documentation be made available.

The Council said that there is no statutory provision requiring a planning authority to furnish to a member of the public copies of any documentation other than an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), a copy of a planning permission and the conditions attached. The Council maintained that a circular from the Department did not direct it to adopt a policy to supplement the statutory position.

Having considered the Council's response, I pointed out that the Department had issued the circular letter following the completion of a formal investigation of a complaint carried out by my Office in 1995. At that time I considered that the practice of refusing to make available planning documentation, for purchase, was at odds with the general thrust of the planning acts and regulations which are formulated in such a way as to allow full participation by members of the public in decisions relating to the proper planning and development of their local areas. The Department's circular requested planning authorities to "put arrangements in place which will make copies of all or part of any document relating to a planning application, other than a plan or other drawing or a photograph, available for purchase."

I noted that there is currently no statutory provision requiring a planning authority to furnish to a member of the public copies of any documentation other than an EIS, a copy of a planning permission and the conditions attached. On the other hand, I indicated that there is no statutory provision which precludes a planning authority from making available the relevant documentation.

I advised the Council of my views and requested that arrangements be put in place to comply with the terms of the Department's circular. Following my suggestion the Council agreed to send the requested documents to the complainant.

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