- Skip Navigation |
- Sitemap |
- Text Size: A |
- A |
- A
- Make a Complaint
- About Us
- FAQs
- Legislation
- Press Releases
- Speeches
- Publications
- Sample Cases
- Languages Act
- Disability Act 2005
The Office of the Ombudsman is open between 9.15 and 5.30 Monday to Thursday and 9.15 to 5.15 on Friday.
18 Lr. Leeson Street, Dublin 2.
Tel: +353-1-639 5600
Lo-call: 1890 223030
Fax: (01) 639 5674 Email: ombudsman@ombudsman.gov.ie
Annual Report of the Ombudsman 2003
Chapter 2 - Northern Area Health Board - Domiciliary Care Allowance
I was unhappy about the outcome of an application for Domiciliary
Care Allowance in the Northern Area Health Board in respect of a child
suffering from Asperger's Syndrome. As well as resolving the complaint
I have also highlighted the need for consistency in approach to the
decision making process for the allowance throughout the health board
system.
Domiciliary Care Allowance (DCA) is a monthly allowance payable
in respect of children from birth to the age of 16 who are so severely
physically or mentally handicapped that they require continuous care
and attention which is substantially in excess of that normally
required by a child of the same age. Eligibility for the allowance is
determined not necessarily by the diagnosis of a condition but rather
by reference to the degree of additional care and attention which
follows as a result. The evidence submitted to health boards in support
of an application for DCA can come from the child's consultant, GP,
speech therapist, school or indeed, from the child's parents
themselves. Applications are assessed by the Senior Area Medical
Officers (SAMO) working within the health boards.
I received a complaint against the Northern Area Health Board
from a man whose son had been diagnosed as suffering from Asperger's
Syndrome at two years and ten months. His parents applied for DCA and
had been awarded it from the date of application. The Board had,
however, refused to backdate the allowance to the child's second
birthday as was provided for in the guidelines governing the payment of
DCA at the time. The reason given was that there was no independent
medical evidence to support the contention that the child required care
and attention substantially in excess of that normally required by a
child of the same age prior to the date of application.
The child had been medically assessed at the age of two years
and had been referred to a Consultant in Developmental Paediatrics for
further examination. This Consultant had submitted a detailed report in
support of the application for DCA confirming that the child had become
lost for words and withdrawn from about 15 months of age, and that he
had a significant communication disorder, with poor eye contact and
limited interaction. She stated that the child appeared to be on the
autistic spectrum and arranged for him to undergo a number of tests.
These tests subsequently determined that the child was suffering from
Asperger's Syndrome. The Consultant stated that, in her opinion, the
child required care and attention in excess of his peers and that his
family were going to need a great deal of assistance and support.
The complainant explained to me that while his son had formally
been diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome at the age of two years and ten
months, this did not change the level of excess care and attention
which his son required and had been receiving throughout his infancy. I
asked that the Director of Customer Services and Appeals review the
case in conjunction with the SAMO taking into consideration all of the
information contained in the medical reports. However, the SAMO
continued to hold the view that there was no objective evidence which
would allow the Board to award the Allowance from the child's second
birthday.
This case highlighted a particular issue in relation to
consistency of decision making in DCA. The decision to grant or refuse
the allowance is made by administrative staff, on foot of a
recommendation by a SAMO. It is my experience that administrative staff
feel obliged to accept the recommendation of the SAMO, effectively
making him or her the decision maker in this type of case.
Administrative staff do not consider themselves to be capable of
assessing the contrasting views of the medical opinions in these cases.
They would not see it as their role to evaluate the opinions of the
SAMO and an applicant's medical advisor. They saw the SAMO's
recommendation as a definitive statement. Effectively, unless there was
some obvious error by the SAMO (e.g. the wrong person is named), there
is no objective basis for them to reject the SAMO's recommendation.
In this particular case, there was medical opinion coming
forward from the applicant that supported the claim that the child
would have qualified for the allowance from age two. My staff had made
enquiries of other health boards and confirmed that the allowance
would, in fact, have been granted by them in the circumstances quoted.
Following a further review of the matter by the Chief Executive Officer
of the Board, the allowance was paid in respect of the child from the
age of two and appropriate arrears paid.
